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Consejero Independiente

The Italian Football Proxy Week

The AGMs (Annual General Meetings) of 3 Italian football clubs will be held this week. Juventus (24thOctober), AS Roma (26th October) and Lazio (27th October) are presenting their financial results, management reports and some regular proposals to their shareholders after closing their respective balances on 30th June.

Figures among the 3 teams are quite unbalanced as Juventus has reigned the Italian championships during the last 6 seasons. This previous 2016/2017 season, Juventus won Scudetto (sixth in a row), Coppa Italia (third in a row) and was runner-up of the Champions League.

(in Million EUR) Juventus 2017/2016 Juventus 2015/2016 Lazio 2016/2017 Lazio 2015/2016 AS Roma 2017/2020 AS Roma 2017/2021
Revenue 562,7 387,9 85,95 80,81 No data No data
EBITDA 67,2 20,2 8,08 -15,6 No data No data
Net Income 42,6 4,1 4,86 0,98 -42,6 -14
Total Debt 701,43 476,62 57,58 35,67 No data No data
Debt to Total Assets % 82,8% 82,6% 40,54% 30,96% No data No data
Total Assets 847,2 577 142 118,2 No data No data
Market Value (at 25/10/17) 751,79 81,56 182,47

 

 

The significant increase of Juventus’ revenues is mainly due to the revenues category of Football player rights management as disclosed in their Financial Report. Nevertheless, all revenue categories have experienced significant improvement.

Juventus Revenues Breakdown (in Million EUR)
2016/2017 2015/2016 Dif.%
Ticketing 57,84 43,67 32%
Media and TV rights 232,77 194,90 19%
Sponsors 74,72 70,01 7%
Merchandising 19,20 13,51 42%
Football player rights management 151,15 46,40 226%
Other 27,03 19,41 39%
Total 562,71 387,90 45%

 

 

The agendas of the 3 meetings do not include any significant proposals to be voted by shareholders. The only remarkable issue is the AS Roma capital increase proposal, up to 120 Million in ordinary shares with the objective of rebalancing their financial structure, mainly by reducing current debt (see agenda).

The evolution of the share value of the three quoted teams has also been quite different during the last 12 months. While Lazio and Juventus have experienced increases in value close to 145%, AS Rome has barely increased 6% after not being able to reach the Champions League during the last season.

In terms of quality of their information disclosure to shareholders, Juventus is also leading the threesome, though there is much room for improvement. Special concern arise with AS Rome, whose communication standards are surprisingly below the average in a moment where the company is asking their shareholders to support such impacting capital increase.

The fact that, according to the Italian press, the main shareholder of AS Roma (Neep Roma Holding, holding 76%), would have already provided part of the funds in advance in relation to the capital increase should not be a reason to forget to duly inform the remaining shareholders about financial and corporate governance issues.

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Note on Corporate Governance and Institutional Investors

Some months ago Observatorio de Divulgación Financiera (ODF), think tank linked to the Institut d’Estudis Financers (IEF) in Barcelona, proposed us to write a note on Corporate Governance and Institutional Investors. The note come out this month. Find the link to the publication in Spanish: http://www.iefweb.org/ief/divulgacion-financiera/observatorio-divulgacion-financiera/doc/65

More than 800 professionals of the economic and financial sector are subscribed to the ODF newsletter, which has also other interesting publications available in here: http://www.iefweb.org/es/divulgacion-financiera/observatorio-divulgacion-financiera

From Alembeeks Group, we are always pleased to contribute to the promotion of corporate governance applications which foster a better context for the development of business activities and societies.

Western Digital: Anuncio de Junta General

Western Digital Corp (WDC) anunció ayer el proxy statement para la junta anual el próximo 2 de noviembre. Comparto en este link el documento.

MetLife: Junta Especial

MetLife (MET) anunció ayer el proxy statement para la junta especial como consecuencia del spin-off de Brighthouse Financial, Inc. Comparto en este link el documento.

Snap Inc: Acciones Sin Derechos

Con la salida a bolsa de Snap Inc., hemos presenciado como una rara avis del gobierno corporativo de empresas cotizadas se extendía entre inversores.

Se trata de la primera vez desde 1940 que se emite en el NYSE una clase de acción que tiene 0 derechos de voto.

Esta emisión ha puesto el grito en el cielo entre los defensores del gobierno corporativo. Comparto el buen artículo de Ken Bertsch, Council of Institutional Investors, en el Harvard Law School Forum.

Como otros casos (Facebook o Google), los fundadores se han quedado con acciones con 10 derechos por acción. Sin embargo, en el caso de Snap, las clases de acciones ofrecidas en la oferta pública de venta se han quedado sin derechos (existe una tercera clase con 1 derecho por acción para los inversores previos a la salida a bolsa).

Como argumenta el autor, las estructuras multiclase representan riesgos sustanciales a la hora de proteger a los inversores, mantener mercados de capitales justos, ordenados y eficientes; y facilitar la formación de capital.

Será interesante ver si los inversores institucionales aplican filtros o descuentos de valoración a este tipo de empresas en las que sus derechos no siguen el principio de proporción entre riesgo económico y peso político.

Creación y distribución de valor: Ejemplo Viscofan

Tan sólo compartir con vosotros un gráfico que me ha parecido interesante en el Informe Anual de Viscofan. Ya he publicado otros gráficos de este tipo en el pasado (como el de BMW, etc.).

Sin embargo, es solo para comentar que aquí también se hacen cosas bien y que para publicar bien no es necesario ser tremendamente grande como BMW (aún así Viscofan está en el Ibex 35, con sus 2.350 Millones en capitalización a dia de hoy).

Viscofan 2016

 

Mr. John Chevedden, se le saluda.

La prensa tiende a preferir a los Carl Icahn o Dan Loeb como referentes de inversores activistas, sin embargo el impacto de John Chevedden en el mundo empresarial de Estados Unidos es notable.

Los estilos son totalmente diferentes.

Comparto un muy buen artículo publicado por Reuters en el 2013 titulado: Economy-class activist investor crashes the corporate party

 

Shareholder Activism Summer Readings

Summertime is leaving some space to shareholder activism articles in influential newspapers. In this sense, we would like to share a couple of them, hoping that this trend evolves in something more than a “summer reading”.

The first one, “Call to action” published by The Economist summarizes the recent movements within of activist institutional investors in relation to European companies during these last months.

The second one, “O Canada — ‘The Promised Land For Shareholder Activism’”, published by Forbes, it offers an interesting interview to a veteran proxy advisor that gives us an initial global overview an a following focus on Canada situation.

Although we share these articles in our blog, as we find them explanatory, we do not support all the statements contained in them. Indeed, there are some that disagree and that we will probably develop in next posts.

Have nice summer readings.

El impacto del “passive investment” en el “active ownership”

Hago un post específico para este artículo de Ronald Orol “How Index Funds Could Turbocharge Activism” que resume perfectamente el contexto en el que se mueven ahora las compañías cotizadas y los inversores activistas.

Resumen ejecutivo

“The relationship between activists and big index funds is strong,” Rossman said. “And each year as more money flows into passive strategies, passive managers become more assertive, willing to use their large stake and influence to have companies make changes.”

“Welling’s fund Engaged Capital LLC accumulated a 9.9% stake over a short period of time. In addition, long-term holders Vanguard Ltd., Fidelity Investments, and BlackRock Inc. each own about 8% of the company, according to FactSet Research Systems Inc. As a result, Hain’s top four holders control well over 30% of the company—and its top 12 investors control about 50%.

 

Therefore, instead of convincing hundreds of shareholders to support his director candidates, Welling only has to convince a handful to back his efforts.”

“However, don’t expect it to be all share-price spikes and acquisition premiums for activist investors any time soon. Insurgents still have to face the fact that for a variety of reasons there is a better than not chance that index funds won’t back their campaigns. And legislators on Capitol Hill are trying to impose tougher regulations on proxy advisory firms, which could make life more difficult for activist funds and their director battles.”

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