Comparto un interesante artículo del The Economist publicado este mes sobre las diferentes tribus del gobierno corporativo.
Aunque prefiero no explicar mucho para que paséis directamente a su lectura, me gustaría resaltar 2 puntos del texto:
“Yet according to law and convention in most rich countries, firms are run in the interest of shareholders, who usually want companies to use every legal means to maximise their profits.
Naive executives fear that they cannot reconcile these two impulses….
Wiser executives know that shareholder value comes in shades of grey.”
“In the contest between shareholders and the people, companies and bosses are caught in the middle. But there are no final victories. Just constant, pragmatic accommodations.”
Y un par de ejemplos:
“…the corporate fundamentalists. Boosting their profits and share price—immediately—is their goal. Firms built on these objectives rarely do well for long. Valeant, a Canadian pharmaceutical concern, is an example. In 2011-15 it raised prices, slashed investment, paid little tax and fired staff. By 2016 it faced scandals and its shares fell by 85%. Occasionally firms become so weak that they use fundamentalist tactics, temporarily, to try to restore confidence.”
“Paul Polman describes Unilever, the consumer-goods firm he runs, as a non-governmental organisation committed to cutting poverty. He can do so only because Unilever makes a stonking return on equity (ROE) of 34%.”
Espero que haya sido de interés y que disfrutéis de la lectura.